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ABSTRACT

This project provides a comprehensive examination of the strategic, operational and
organizational character of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). The purpose of the
project is two fold: first, to challenge the perception that ISIS and al-Qā’ida are fundamentally
“one and the same;” and, second, to offer policy makers a systematic and detailed description of
ISIS on its own merits. Drawing on variables pertaining to three dimensions—strategy,
operations, and organizational characteristics—and informed by both primary sources and
secondary analyses, I investigate the qualitative differences between the two organizations. I find
that, despite some similarities, ISIS and al-Qā’ida vary considerably in all facets. Accordingly, I
offer targeted policy recommendations aimed at making current counter-strategy more effective
and efficient.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction
____________________________________________________

!
!

Despite the enormity of scholarship on al-Qā’ida post-2001, and the now growing—yet still
relatively limited—amount of scholarship on the Islamic State, there have been no empiricallybased studies comparatively analyzing these two organizations. This is surprising given the
extent to which these two groups are equated in the popular and policy discourse and the
perception that ISIS is becoming a significant threat to the homeland. For example, ISIS is still
referred to as an al-Qā’ida off-shoot and their rise to prominence during the Syria civil war
described as marking al-Qā’ida’s resurgence in Syria.1
This tendency to treat ISIS as an extension of AQ is due, in part, is due to a lingering
infatuation with al-Qā’ida (AQ) and a general tendency to interpret similar phenomena through
the same analytical lens. In this respect, the Islamic State (ISIS) is seen as a mere manifestation
of AQ. Resourcefulness, although probably just a softer characterization of the same problem,
likely also plays a part here, especially in explaining the relative imbalance in scholarship
covering the Islamic State. Instead of constructing a new and organization-specific base of
knowledge, academicians and practitioners are relying to a large extent on existing scholarship.
But for an organization that hardly represents any known precedent, wholly equating it to another
group is altogether problematic. And this has had a marked effect on our understanding of the
organization. Other than their most obvious, and, incidentally, most recent, divergence (i.e., their

1 Azeem

Ibrahim, “The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq,” Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College (2014).
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now overt non-affiliation), little is known about how and why ISIS and AQ differ. This is quite
surprising, considering that the entirety of current US policy toward the Islamic State is based on
its “one and the same[-ness]” as al-Qā’ida.2 This grouping-together of these groups stems from
the Pentagon’s current legal justification for the ongoing offensive against ISIS: The 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against AQ.3
The synonymization of these organizations has obvious implications for American
strategic planners. Not only does it project on US analysts and strategists a number of a priori
analytical suppositions—in effect, biasing them toward, and committing them to, the official
position of the government, regardless of its veracity—but it also binds them to a set of policy
options which may not be altogether fit for combatting ISIS. If its categorization of the threat is
factually wrong, it could lead not only to general inefficiency in resource allocation, but also to
combat prolongation, out-right failure, or even exacerbation of the problem. It could also have
detrimental consequences on regional security. Prolonged and misinformed military activity
undermines both political and social stability, and severely impacts upon local populations—
causing, among other problems, internal displacement, civilian casualties, shortages of food and
other basic necessities, and sustained psychological trauma.
Despite this synonymization, even a curious glance reveals a number of red flags. The
organization exercises de facto control over thousands of square miles of Iraqi and Syrian
territory; it attracts thousands of new fighters to its rank-and-file every month; it grosses millions

2

Spencer Ackerman, “Obama maintains Al-Qaida and ISIS are ‘one and the same’ despite evidence of
schism,” The Guardian (October 2, 2014).
3

!

Massimo Calabresi, “Obama’s Anti-ISIS War in Syria May Be Illegal,” Time (September 11, 2014).
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of dollars in revenue every day; and it maintains an enormous army, large enough to sustain its
large-scale operations. All of these overwhelmingly outweigh any threat that al-Qā’ida ever
constituted, and bare little resemblance to that organization. For a body of scholarship wholly
deficient of any rigorous, comparative analysis, this should be somewhat alarming.
The current project attempts to address this deficiency. Looking at the organizations sideby-side, it offers an objective, comparative view of two entities that are so regularly equated as
one in US media and policy circles. By systematically comparing these two organizations,
strategically, operationally and organizationally, this project aims to determine what similarities
objectively exist and whether there are key differences between the Islamic State and al-Qā’ida
in order to inform which aspects of the existing US counterterrorism strategy can be reasonably
adapted to combatting ISIS and where specific, Islamic State policies should apply.
While the Islamic State and al-Qā’ida certainly have similarities—importantly, a shared
vision of an Islamic Caliphate and desired disruption of the current (global) socio-political order
—there are a number of key differences between the two. Rooted in variable operating
environments and structural organization, these differences culminate in starkly contrasting
grand strategies. On the one hand, al-Qā’ida, which lacked any tangible, independentlycontrolled base of operation and which relied almost entirely on its vulnerable, externallygenerated income, maintained a very asymmetric strategy—one which assumed that short-term
political and social change was a necessary precursor to long-term reunification and sustenance.
Indeed, theirs was a strategy that emphasized strength of the enemy and conducts asymmetric
operations where the enemy is strong. On the other hand, the Islamic State, working from its
resource-abundant stronghold in Syria and Iraq, maintains an operational and organizational
!

12

structure that enables it to pursue a relatively more conventional insurgent, or “state-like,”
strategy. This strategy, which has parallels with many large-scale insurgencies that have invoked
global revolution, is one that supposes political and social change through an initial consolidation
of power and support. This strategy is one that emphasizes their own strength and, therefore,
focuses their operations where they are strongest. These strategic differences and the operational
nuances underlying them have been blurred by years of misinformed policy and call into
question the efficacy of current attempts at rolling-back the Islamic State. To better formulate US
COIN/CT policy toward the region, the outdated framework upon which current counter-strategy
is based should be adapted to these differences.

!
1.1 Background
!

How and why the organizations’ qualitative differences came about—and evolved—involves
historical and sociopolitical context. Subtle differences between the organizations, which go all
the way back to their creation, combined with challenging operational environments, initially
pulled these organizations together. But a rapid, large-scale shift the geopolitical character of the
region exaggerated these differences tremendously, pushing them apart—and ultimately resulting
in the schism that occurred in 2014.
Defining the security landscape and social environments in which these organizations
matured, are two very telling stories. These stories are best understood temporally and
geographically. Prior to the democratic zeal and pluralistic thinking of the “Arab Spring”
movements, authoritarianism and submission to the state reigned supreme in the Middle East.
Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this even held true for Saddam’s Baathist government. Security

!
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institutions, like the intelligence services of Iraq and Syria, acted brutally and with nearimpunity. They commanded large resources, ran a number of well-developed human informant
networks, and operated with little oversight at the behest of the region’s authoritarian leaders.
When organizations like al-Qā’ida and ISIS first materialized in the 1990s, these rather
unfriendly circumstances limited the groups’ capacity to organize themselves and to market their
beliefs and goals. Constant surveillance and repeated attempts at penetrating the organizations
drove them underground, adapting them to constantly changing and ever-challenging operational
environments. Those like ISIS, which had an intimate connection to geography and little space
for operation, gained experience operating in denied areas, but suffered immensely. They had no
place to train and no means for gaining publicity for their causes. Those like AQ, whose raison
d’être superseded spatial tangibility, found other places to operate, on the periphery of
authoritarian states—in places like the Sudan and Afghanistan. Initially, this proved
advantageous for al-Qā’ida, as it showed an attractive alternative—i.e., a group with which to
train in a place which allowed for training—for other jihadists and jihadist-oriented
organizations; recruiting new followers, was, of course, key to AQ’s then-faltering success. And
so al-Qā’ida grew, incorporating into its ranks groups like ISIS.
How this franchising approach impacted on its new members differs from organization to
organization. But, generally, it brought them together and pulled them apart, simultaneously.
They acted as a single unit under the AQ banner, but, by and large, they maintained their own
individual dispositions. Subordination under the structurally decentralized AQ, based then in
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), provided a highly marketable facade for
ISIS, known then as Tanẓīm Qā’idat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidīn (al-Qā’ida in Iraq, or AQI). At
!
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the expense of its then only partially-developed identity, AQI adopted the Bin Laden “brand” of
global jihad in lieu of its locally-oriented struggle, submitting itself to the guidance of al-Qā’ida
core leadership. But this was more symbolic than anything. AQI founder and ideologue, Abū
Muṣ’ab al-Zarqawi, much like his counterparts, showed little desire to fully temper his
organization’s strategy and operations to match that of AQ.4 Indeed, his and Bin Laden’s
relationship was defined purely by mutual self-interest—not servitude.
Ideologically, AQI was mired in its grudge against Shī’a Muslims and ethnic minorities—
one which AQ shared but refused to act upon. This grudge varied considerably from its early
years to its decoupling with AQ. Following the dismantlement of Iraq’s Baathist regime and the
subsequent empowerment of the Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-Islāmīah, Shī’a marginalization of Sunnis
redefined their image in the eyes of AQI, from a people merely representing takfīrī, heretical
beliefs to one symbolizing a tangible, existential threat to fundamentalist Sunni tradition. Even
during the early years of Iraq’s sectarian civil war, al-Qā’ida leadership was at odds with AQI for
its incessant focus on fighting the Shī’a.5 Following the mass mobilization of Arab populations
against authoritarianism in 2011, the devolution of Syria into civil war some months later took
on a tone of sectarian strife. The rigidity of opinion that this polarization caused, combined with
the absence of the old, oppressive instruments of authority, proved a fertile environment for
religious groups with regional ambitions to vie for power and influence. Like in Iraq during the

4 Andrew

Phillips, “How al Qaeda lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63.1 (2009),

69-70.
5

Ibid., 70. See also Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The
Washington Quarterly 29.4 (2006), 19-32.
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civil war, the pronounced ideological social bifurcations in Syria not only stoked its anti-Shī’a
fervor, but created opportunities for AQI to absorb and influence new supporters.
It is tempting to see this short-lived era of affiliation as a defining stage of the Islamic
State’s development. But, really, this period is only marginally important. From 2004 to 2013,
AQI/ISIS essentially ran on autopilot, hibernating through the challenging environment of the
region, letting Bin Laden shoulder the responsibility. This was especially so during the US
occupation of Iraq, when al-Qā’ida served as the focus of the American-led “War on Terror.”
Although weakened during this period, and almost entirely defeated in its Ramadi stronghold,
AQI held out until it saw prospects for ISAF withdrawal a few years later.
This, combined with failure of Iraqi/Syrian security institutions and general weakness of
the state, made obsolete the very reason ISIS had initially joined AQ. By then, whether their
relationship lasted was unimportant for Baghdadi and his deputies; whatever visage of the Qā’ida
connection remained was purely superficial. If anything, this symbolic subordination to Zawahiri
hindered Baghdadi. Disarray in Syria and the weak Iraqi state were fertile grounds for recruiting
new followers and disseminating propaganda, and Baghdadi was keenly aware of this. His
declaration of jurisdiction over both Syria and Iraq in 2013, and the onslaught of AQC
reprehension that then ensued, made clear that a AQ-ISIS breakup was nigh.
These contextual differences explain much of what followed. In the security vacuum that
emerged, the Islamic State, with its back-burner desires to be an influential takfīrī movement in
its own backyard, grew immensely. Exploiting favorable social, political, and security
conditions, ISIS rampaged through Syria and Iraq, fighting antagonistic rebel movements and
taking with it land, weapons, resources and fighters. While it and al-Qā’ida may have been
!
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independently definable organizations from the beginning—albeit, ones with ideological
commonalities and some transient, organizational and operational overlap, the civil war in Syria
created the conditions that enabled their very rapid and decisive divergence. Since February
2014, they are not only distinct organizations, but differ organizationally, operationally, and
strategically. While similarities remain in terms of the ultimate vision of a future in which the
Caliphate is restored and western influence diminished, they are fundamentally different in ways
that require a distinct counter policy response. However, the continued targeting of ISIS as an
AQ affiliate or even as AQ’s possible usurper overlooks these differences and, in doing so,
amplifies the failure of US counter policy toward this dangerous but distinct group.

!
1.2 Client Description
!

The US Department of Defense (DOD) provides “the military forces needed to deter war and to
protect the security of [the United States].”6 In addition to carrying out offensive and defense
military operations, DOD strategy-makers are tasked with developing efficient policies which
guide the pursuit of these aims. Given the ongoing offensive against the Islamic State, a
fundamental examination of US policy toward ISIS—that is, the foundation upon which this
policy is premised—directly implicates the interests of DOD. By identifying and correcting the
shortcomings of this policy, the present study seeks to increase the efficiency of the Department
of Defense’s counter strategy toward ISIS.

!
1.3 Analytical Framework
!
6

!

Department of Defense, “Mission,” available at http://www.defense.gov/about/.
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The durability of the ISIS as AQ’s “junior varsity”7 is understandable given the historical
linkages detailed above, perceived competition for affiliates and the fact that they both rail
against the west, have killed westerners and that western targets have been struck in their name.
However, from a counter strategy perspective what matters is their organizational structure, how
they behave operationally, and their actual strategy. The analytical clarity necessary to define or
adjust the US policy response can be provided through an examination of their

military

operations, decision-making processes, and organizational structure, and they afford both
analytical clarity and help fine-tune policy and targetable adjustments. Given the overlapping and
interconnected nature of these traits — e.g., between military operations and military strategy —
parsing them into these individual units can be somewhat of a demanding task, and any effort at
doing so will have at least some shortcomings. Nevertheless, this approach will enable more
targeted policy adjustments than assumptions based on surface similarities. Thus, this project
offers a three-part analytical model: strategy, operations, and organizational character. Since
Clausewitz, these analytic components—which encompass goals, capacity, and leadership—have
been essential in evaluating the use of force as an instrument of policy.8
The first division, strategy, helps us understand why organizations do what they do and
want what they want. Strategy includes the logic behind both the organizations’ existence and
expressions of their existence — i.e., the particular reason they do certain things and the means

7

In a January 7 interview with a reporter from the New Yorker magazine, President Obama
referred to ISIS as the al-Qā’ida JV squad; see http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/
going-the-distance-2?currentpage=all (accessed January 24, 2015)
8

Barry Posen, “The Sources of Military Doctrine,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force:
Military Power and International Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009).
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by which they hope to achieve certain goals. The second division, operations, helps us
understand what organizations do. This includes manifestations or expressions of a group’s
strategy and decision-making — things like territorial acquisition, governance, and military
activity. The final division, organizational characteristics, helps us understand how organizations
achieve these things; these are the particular characteristics and instruments (i.e., descriptive and
non-descriptive) by which an organization’s strategy and operations are carried out. Soldiers,
military materiel, energy, and organizational structure represent but a few examples of
organizational character.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!

CHAPTER TWO

Methodology
____________________________________________________

!

In conducting this comparison, the project draws on two principle sources of information: (i)
open-source, primary information available on websites, social networking fora, newspapers,
scholarly journals, and other publications, in addition to videos available on sites like YouTube;
and (ii) conceptual and theoretical secondary analyses.9
Selection of these cases—and ISIS, in particular—raises two valid concerns. Foremost,
the Islamic State represents a rapidly changing organization in a rapidly changing region. Not
only is it subject to the ongoing transformation of the regional security environment—due, in
part, to an ongoing, western-backed intervention—but it is also affected by other, powerful
geopolitical currents like the Syrian Civil War. I acknowledge this concern and the constraints it
places on the validity and relevance of this study’s results. To help correct the issue, I have
placed temporal boundaries on the scope of my research: anything prior to November 2014
constitutes my pool of data and analysis. Although a more defined, better documented case
selection may better serve the needs of scholarly research, the policy-driven nature of the present
study is inherently defined by, or at least subject to, issues which are in constant flux.
The second issue concerns the availability of open-source information. While there has of
late been a marked increase in attention devoted to the Islamic State, there remains a
disproportionately limited amount of credible analysis and raw data, especially compared to that

9

!

No human sources were consulted in the course of this study.
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on AQ. This could have obvious adverse effects on the study’s reliability. I attempt to control for
this by focusing heavily on other objectively-identifiable, factual information. This will be
extracted from both primary sources and secondary analyses. When available, factual gaps are
filled with raw data obtained from primary sources (e.g., official statements and tweets from the
organization’s official media arm); when information is not available, these gaps are
acknowledged.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER THREE

Literature Review
____________________________________________________

!

Research on Islamic extremism and terrorism was relatively limited prior to—and even
immediately following—the events of September 11, 2001. But scholarship eventually
burgeoned and groups like al-Qā’ida became a popular topic for researchers.
Mosul’s recent fall to the Islamic State provoked a similar effect. With a growing
readership hungry for all-things-ISIS, the international media has made it one of the most salient
issues. Countless analyses, ranging from the purely theoretical to the practical, have emerged
from freelance writers and thinkers, Washington’s premier think tanks, and the top security
scholars. A number of books detailing ISIS’s mysterious inner workings are, likewise, now slated
for publication. Despite the headway, and much like the scholarship of the immediate post-9/11
period, relatively few comprehensive studies on the Islamic State exist—and much of what we
do have is ill-adapted to policy.
In spite of these challenges, current scholarship, although largely piecemeal in nature,
give us tremendous insight into the machinery behind these organizations. Pulling it together
under a single study allows for a comprehensive picture and nuanced appreciation of these two
groups. Generally, this literature follows three broad themes, strategy, operations, and
organizational characteristics, which I replicate here and use as a basis for my comprehensive
analysis in Chapter 4. However, as I will show, contemporary discussions of terrorist strategy
have emphasized rationality and de-emphasized variables like territory that were emphasized in
discussions of terrorist tactics in conjunction with insurgencies.
!
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!
2.1 Strategy
Since September 11, 2001, many studies have treated terrorism as a rational strategy of
asymmetric warfare. In discussing the utility of terror, the majority of these studies emphasize
the response of the target or an intended target audience in explaining strategy and de-emphasize
organizational and environmental factors that dominated studies of asymmetric warfare in the
pre-September 11 era. For example, Kydd and Walter’s typology of five terrorist strategies—
attrition, intimidation, outbidding, provocation, and spoiling—focuses on two targets of
persuasion (the enemy and a domestic population) and three uncertainties (power, resolve, and
trustworthiness).10 Given the circumstances under which a terror campaign is waged, the strategy
utilized may differ considerably. The Neumann and Smith model similarly looks at the target’s
response. According to their three-step framework for terrorism,11 a group: (i) disorients its
enemy through an attack; (ii) induces target reaction by the enemy (which is ideally an illegal or
disproportionately heavy-handed response that polarize opinion and mobilizes supporters); and
(iii) exploits this opportunity to gain legitimacy and insert its own alternative message. Models
like that that allow an organization a predictable response, or even a second-tier predictable
response, offer a unique and reasonable perspective on strategic thinking. But the premise that
terror groups have perfect information and act with perfect rationality—and are somehow able to

10

Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31.1 (2006): 49-79.

11

Peter R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, “Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and Its Fallacies,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 28.4 (2005): 571-595.
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predict every move of their enemy—is both contested and not easily reconciled with actual
results.
Environmental determinants, removed from the analytical scrutiny of strategic planners
mired in operational secrecy, have immense influence on these responses. And these external
variables cannot easily and systematically be built into a model like this.
Another example is Martha Crenshaw’s four-part model that describes the utility of
terrorism in terms of incentives and opportunities.12 Terror acts, she argues, can be used to
mobilize support and polarize ideological differences. This drives committed followers into a
group’s sphere of influence and rallies them against the enemy. They can also be used to provoke
overreaction or compel enemy submission. Crenshaw offers September 11, 2001, and the
subsequent US military response in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a case in point, describing the
politically detrimental American reaction as an intended consequence of the attacks.
Crenshaw’s framework is a useful tool for conceptualizing of and interpreting terrorism.
However, like much of the scholarship on terrorist strategy, it is focused on generalizeable
frameworks that help scholars better understand the nature of terrorism as a whole, but offers
little in the way of understanding the operational environment and organizational dynamics
which actually shape that strategy. This oversight is apparent when applying her framework to
specific examples where the results are difficult to reconcile with conceptual logic. For example,
the provocation element of her argument unravels quickly in relation to AQ and September 11. If
AQ attacked the US to provoke response that would diminish American credibility, did al-Qā’ida

12

Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism and Global Security,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, eds. Chester A.
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007,
67-82.
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leadership also anticipate the near-destruction of their organization (i.e., as a consequence of the
War on Terror)? And, if AQ’s objectives really were to challenge US influence in the region,13 is
it plausible that bolstering an American and western regional presence—and one which lasted for
over a decade—was part of this strategy? Both of these are unlikely.
As Nacos lucidly explains, “they [al-Qā’ida] lost their safe haven, headquarters, training
facilities, and weapon arsenals in Afghanistan. In this respect, Bin Laden and his colleagues
underestimated perhaps the resolve of the US government and public and the willingness of
many other governments to cooperate with Washington.”14 And, indeed, had they pondered the
possibility of a US ground invasion, AQ leaders had little means by which to anticipate the level
of resolve generated by the attacks, both within the US and among its allies.
More inclusive models, which incorporate variables like internal politics, leadership,
organizational dynamics, and psychology, also fail to draw upon these environmental
determinants. McCormick, for example, draws on these points in his piece on terrorist decision
making.15
Although AQ has been the primary focal point for studies on strategy, a few ISIS-specific
discussions have also emerged. Brookings scholars Daniel Byman, Shadi Hamid, Charles Lister,
William McCants and Jeremy Shapiro, for example, offer their various perspectives in a

13

For English summaries of the 1996 and 1998 fatawa, see: “Al Qaeda Declarations and Acts of War,” The Heritage
Foundation, available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-detention/al-qaeda-declarations. For the
original 1998 declaration of jihad, see “nas bῑān aljbhat alislāmῑa ala’limῑa ljihād alyehud walslῑbῑῑn,” Al-Quds AlArabi (February 23, 1998), available at: http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm.
14

Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11: A Model for Future Terrorism?” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 26.1 (2003), 13.
15

!

Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 473-507.
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roundtable discussion on Islamic State strategy.16 Brian Fishman offers a more-detailed
perspective on the strategy of its AQI predecessor, notably including discussion on the strategic
differences between it and AQC concerning sectarian differences.17 Most of these have been
piecemeal in nature, with little holistic discussion on the grand strategy of ISIS.
The impact of AQ on the study of terrorism is also evident in the fact that it is now seen
as a phenomenon that is somehow distinct or unique to insurgency, revolution or guerrilla war as
opposed to a tactic employed in those forms of asymmetric warfare. There are a few notable
exceptions in the current literature. Merari, for example, in explaining the different strategies of
violent struggle, highlights the differences and similarities between conventional war, guerrilla
war, and terrorism. The author uses as case studies the Algerian FLN, the Vietminh and the
Vietcong, and the “Shock Committees” of Palestine, in addition to others. He notes that “the
mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and
that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle.”18 An
interesting side note made by Merari concerns a key difference between guerrilla warfare and
terrorism: the former, the author argues, seeks to tangibly control territory, whereas the former
does not. But he goes on to explain that, “In reality, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between
terrorism and guerrilla war even with the help of the criteria offered [in this study].”19
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In a 1970s study, Jenkins identifies five stages of urban guerrilla warfare strategy: the
violent propaganda stage; the organizational growth stage; the guerrilla offensive; the
mobilization of the masses; and, finally, the urban uprising. These processes are defined by two
key constraints: the difficulty of moving guerrilla movements—which largely begin in rural
areas—into cities; and constraints that limit urban activity.20 Given the rural-urban divide, Marks
points out that insurgencies often “field approaches and doctrine[s]” to exploit the different
environs which define rural and urban areas; these can lead to organizational fractures and
splinter groups.21

!
2.2 Operations and Organization
!

Literature on operations and organization follows a number of sub-themes. Public perception, a
consequence of governance and propaganda, is one of these. Looking at public opinion of ISIS,
two separate studies measured the internal and external perceptions of the group, respectively.
The former, a study done by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, measured general
Arab opinion of the Islamic State, looking in particular at the susceptibility of other regional
populations to ISIS propaganda and its future endeavors.22 They found low support, between 0%
and 5%, in all populations studied, which included random samples of Egyptians, Lebanese, and
Saudis. The latter study, which measured internal opinion of ISIS in the Syrian city of Manbij,
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generally revealed similar low opinion levels, but showed some degree of consensual support.23
Given the difficulty of accessing populations under ISIS control, information on internal
perception is relatively limited. Although similar studies have been conducted on support for AQ,
given that that organization currently neither controls nor tangibly threatens to control any
population, these are not included in the present study.
Another sub-theme is organizational structure. A number of commentators have analyzed
the structure of AQ, which has evolved from a relatively hierarchically-structured organization to
a highly decentralized one. One of the common points of inquiry is the utility of cellular
structure to AQC. Neumann et al examine, for example, the ‘middle men’ of al-Qā’ida, and their
constitution of the ‘connective tissue’ which ties together grassroots operatives and the core.24
Moghadam also parses the various layers of AQ, finding that senior- and middle-management
operatives serve the most important role in innovation.25 In Helfstein and Wright’s study on
structure and operational success, the three tiers of AQ—the core, second-tier leadership, and
individuals/cells—are analyzed in terms of their ability to carry out successful attacks.26
No known systematic studies on ISIS organizational structure have yet been completed.
However, as new information arises, speculative analyses approximate with growing precision
the structural character of the organization. For example, Soufan Group, a private security and
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intelligence firm based in New York, recently released a monograph detailing ISIS structure and
leadership (among other dimensions), based on open-source intelligence and primary sources.27
While much of the available secondary analyses—and primarily those in news articles and think
tank publications—regurgitate the (unverifiable) facts produced in other works, some
information is corroborated by official media/social media organs of the Islamic State.
Organizational strength is another sub-theme. In a study on the strength of AQ in
Afghanistan,28 Sageman finds that western counterterrorism policies have been largely effective
at disrupting jihadist plots, pointing to the marked reduction in AQ-sponsored attacks, and
particularly those originating in Afghanistan, since September 11, 2001; the author does,
however, support the position that homegrown terrorism is on the rise.29 In another account,
Hoffman disagrees with Sageman, pointing to a still operationally effective AQ and AQC.30
Various declassified intelligence estimates regarding organizational strength and size exist for
both groups. CIA, for example, puts ISIS rank-and-file at 21,000-31,500 fighters,31 while the
Pentagon estimates AQ at 3,000-4,000.32 Various analyses from official state organs and think
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tanks like the Institute for the Study of War (IFSW) also estimate force strength and size,
weapons platforms, and territorial acquisitions. For example, IFSW’s Iraq and Syria situational
reports use open-source intelligence technology to track the daily movements of the Islamic
State, offering continuous updates on positions and combat incidences.33
Rebellion financing and economic factors are a relatively well-documented sub-theme.
Using a data set of wars between the 1960s and the 1990s, Collier and Hoeffler make the case
that economic variables—i.e., the availability of finance and the cost of rebellion—are key
drivers of civil war.34 Fearon and Laitin, examining conditions which favor insurgency, also
found economic variables like poverty to be important factors.35 A number of other studies shed
light on the actual economic workings of these groups.36 Bahney et al. provide perhaps the most
thorough study, offering insight into the financial activity of AQ and (early) AQI, detailing, for
example, the vast criminal enterprise sustained by that organization early-on.37 In another study,
Dickinson looks at the broader, Gulf-based financial network of Syrian rebel movements.38 A
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few attempts at explaining external sources of income, like the illicit oil smuggling network
fueled and operated by ISIS, are also insightful. Giglio offers one of the most elaborate takes,
profiling the complex transit of fuel from the Islamic State to the hands of Turkish
businessmen.39
A final sub-theme, and one which is gaining an increasingly large amount of attention, is
utilization of social and traditional media. Both AQ and ISIS have been the subject of a number
of these studies. Hashem, for example, offers an in-depth analysis of the Islamic State’s
utilization of media, looking in particular at its use of websites and social media platforms as
strategic instruments.40 Ingram offers another perspective, arguing that, while ISIS’ information
operations campaign is not unique per se, its adaptation of this strategy to the twenty-first
century and to its own strategic and operational requirements is unique. He describes the
cumulative impact of three driving elements—reach, relevance, and resonance; synchronization
of information operations with politico-military action; and centrality of the Islamic State brand
to its campaign—as setting ISIS apart from contemporary organizations.41
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CHAPTER FOUR

Analysis
____________________________________________________

!

Where do al-Qā’ida and the Islamic State differ strategically, organizationally, and operationally?
And how might DOD strategists take advantage of these differences? The following chapter
investigates these questions, looking in particular at the feasibility of implementing a common
defense policy for both entities.
Many analysts and policymakers readily, and correctly, observe a number of similarities
between al-Qā’ida and the Islamic State. Ideologically, their beliefs and end goals are the same—
to establish a Caliphate, rule by Sharia Law, and resist external cultural influences—and are
generally rooted in the work of the same pool of Islamic scholars. They have a shared history,
similar marketing schemes, and their close connectivity makes them, at times, indistinguishable.
As a consequence, it is often assumed, perhaps as a result of political convenience or out of
sincere resourcefulness, that these organizations can be dealt with by similar or identical security
policy.
Despite the congruities, the Islamic State and al-Qā’ida, as I will show, are very different
entities with different strategies and different behaviors. Dissimilar operational environments and
structural adaptations, combined with competing perceptions of strength, drives a wedge
between their grand strategies, operations, and organizational characteristics.
This chapter lays out a foundation for policy adjustments that are put forward in Chapter
Five. In the following section, I offer a background on al-Qā’ida strategy, operations, and
organizational characteristics, and compare and contrast the Islamic State with that organization.
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In section 4.2, I examine the strategic, operational, and organizational differences between the
two organizations. In the final section, I summarize these findings and argue that our current
approach for dealing with ISIS is out-of-date.

!
4.1 Al-Qā’ida Strategy, Operations and Organization
!

For over a decade, al-Qā’ida’s strategic and operational character was the focus of considerable
scholarship. While there remains disagreement on some issues—notably, the true aims of the
September 11 attacks—there is a great deal of agreement on others.
Al-Qā’ida’s prominence is largely due to its sensational attacks against US interests
thirteen years ago. After toppling two skyscrapers and heavily damaging DOD’s Pentagon
headquarters, AQ drew the American military into a decade-long offensive in the Middle East
and South Asia. Their ingenuity, and their perceived ability to project their strategy far into the
future, earned AQ and its leadership the infatuation of western analysts—and the fear of many
Americans and Europeans. These and other attacks, like those in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and
Aden, landed AQ on the radar of US intelligence. Bin Laden had, after all, been under close
surveillance since his time in the Sudan in the 1990s.42
What became even more endearing to these analysts, however, was the intangibility of alQā’ida. The organization embodied an ideology that was immune to conventional warfare:
bullets and bombs could kill its enablers, but their ideas and principles, the very substance of
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their organization, were ever-immune.43 As a consequence, defining the “where” of AQ—the
location of its troop formations, command and control centers, communications infrastructure,
and barracks, all hallmarks of the conventional military threat—was quite problematic. Much
like any other globalized commodity, their brand of Islam knew no boundaries, ironically having
no other real “base” than in the minds of its followers. American interests in the region gave the
AQ threat an element of geography and proximity, but, as was made clear, no place was offlimits. “The American homeland is the planet,” [emphasis added] The 9/11 Commission Report
opined,44 affirming the near-obsolescence of geography in contemporary security.
Part and parcel of the organization’s ideology, apart from Wahhabi tradition and the
teachings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayed al-Qutb,45 was an
immense antipathy toward the West.46 Years of support for authoritarian regimes and its overt
regional military presence, dissolved much of the credibility and appeal of the United States and
its European partners. Thirst for oil, and its dependence on regional export markets for its
military industry, not only further entrenched Washington in Middle Eastern affairs, but riled the
already-acrimonious perceptions of the region’s people. From Bin Laden’s first trip to
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Afghanistan during the Soviet resistance, his position on the matter was clear: the Saudi regime,
the Israelis, and the West, all had to go.
This was the raison d’être of his organization. A transnational movement at its very core,
al-Qā’ida fixated on dismantling the prevailing world order, on destroying western governments
and their proxies. For Bin Laden, history told all: The House of Saud had desecrated The Land of
the Two Holy Mosques, corrupt families had plundered Muslim riches, and Israel had for too
long occupied the Farthest Mosque. And he saw the West as nothing less than an enabler of these
atrocities. Fighting it—waging global “jihad” against Europe, the United States, and the apostate
regimes of the region—was the only way he could bring about justice and lay the foundation for
a revived Caliphate. Anything less would be a futile endeavor.
He had an open-eared audience. While radical, his ideas greatly appealed to the angry
sentiments of the wronged and the disenfranchised. The Arab world’s near-unanimous support
for Palestinians, for example, was but one of the common grounds of opinion to which he could
appeal. Calling for the “liberation” of al-Aqsa Mosque and the destruction of Israel not only
portrayed him and his organization as defenders of the Muslim world, but as freedom fighters for
the Arab people. AQ’s particular interpretation of Islam may have been rejected by most, but it
did attract a great deal of support from the fringes of society. Even from more moderate
elements, the organization’s political message was able to draw many into its ideological sphere
of influence.
A vast network of sympathizers, developed and nurtured since the 1980s, facilitated this
process. Following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent repatriation of
Mujahideen, the fervor of militant Islam began to spread. From the coast of West Africa to the
!
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islands of Indonesia and the Philippines, well-connected and battle-hardened veterans launched a
number of locally-oriented movements—ones which often typified the Cold War flavor of jihad.
The ways in which these movements marketed themselves to their constituent audiences varied,
however. Some groups were empowered by the marginalizing effects of authoritarianism and
State regulation; others thrived from society’s aversion to westernization and globalized culture.
While most of them embodied very real social grievances, they also found ideological common
ground with AQ, under the banner of Islam. Whether out of doctrinal alignment or close
connectivity, many of them forged close relationships with AQ leadership. Bin Laden
intentionally kept these affiliations loosely-defined and unofficial, allowing himself not only a
trim and manageable franchise, but one which he could exploit for influence and leverage. Later,
under al-Zawahiri, these relationships became more overt and more institutionalized. Regional
affiliates like al-Qā’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabab, and al-Nusrah Front were
made official AQ branches. Cells across Europe and the United States gave AQ further access to
untapped recruitment pools in the West and allowed it a mouthpiece for its propaganda. New
York-based radical imams like Anwar al-Awlaki, for example, influenced many American and
non-American Muslims, including those responsible for the September 11 airplane hijackings.47
Ideological sentiment and the Afghan link were not the only forces pulling groups closer
to al-Qā’ida. Again, peripheral movements had their own agenda, their own constituencies, and
their own governments to keep at bay. To sustain themselves, they needed revenue, sources of
weapons and recruits, and ways to publicize their causes and gain support. Whether or not these
organizations fully adopted the doctrines or behavioral idiosyncrasies of AQ is beside the point.
47
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What is important is that they used AQ, whether out of last-hope necessity or careful strategic
calculation, to piggyback themselves to a more prosperous position. Scoring a spot on the State
Department’s list of foreign terror organizations (FTOs)—through their affiliation with AQ—was
a fast-track to fame, even if they did not necessarily aspire to that designation. AQC surely
understood the support of these organizations as merely a necessity of their survival, and shortlived at best. Yet they weighed these costs against their own self-interests.
An important component of maintaining these support networks was the internet. Socialnetworking fora like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook not only augmented the AQ recruitment
effort and marketing scheme, but allowed the organization an easier means by which to
communicate with its sympathizers. Leaders periodically took to social media platforms,
disseminating announcements and videos—“long and turgid” ones that often eclipsed an hour in
length48—to encourage followers and affirm their resolve against the West. Special, non-Arabic
publications like Inspire, an English language magazine formerly edited by American Samir
Khan, were used to draw support and readership outside the Arabic-speaking world.49 AQ
affiliates also passed on operational reports, martyrdom announcements, and other updates, using
a number of sites frequented by their supporters. The transmission of operational data and
training information via these “jihadi websites” allowed, at least initially, for rapid and efficient
exchanges between AQC and its former and prospective field operatives. Manuals explaining
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secure communications, proper rifle maintenance, and the construction of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and other tactical instruments, are widely available on these sites.50
Utilization of the internet was, incidentally, one of AQ’s most important operational
developments, post-September 11. Not only did it revolutionize propaganda and communication
—in effect, enabling AQ leaders to “bypass completely traditional, established media outlets”
and to “shape and disseminate their own message in their own way”51—but it also drastically
redefined their operational agenda. Even though AQC continued planning elaborate attacks on
hard targets like embassies and military installations, western counterterrorism initiatives—and
particularly those aimed at disrupting AQ financial networks—made executing these plans
increasingly costly. Rather than relying solely on high-risk/high-cost operations, AQC came to
depend, instead, on its internet-reared, “homegrown” followers in the West.52 As seen with the
attacks and foiled plots in Fort Hood, Detroit and New York, “lone wolves” completely
reinvented al-Qā’ida’s modus operandi.53 Attacking soft targets like malls, stadiums, and public
thoroughfare, places that once elicited little security concern, then became the primary inertia
driving the organization. Not only was this shift a huge force multiplier, but it also reduced the
necessity of constant operational secrecy. If there really was no tangible connection between its
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lone wolf operatives and its core, a reality which runs many terror organizations into problems
with communications, logistics, political message dissemination and general functioning,54 alQā’ida could maintain the degree of insularity it already had without incurring increased risk.
While the immediate benefit of attacking soft targets was lower than that of attacking harder ones
(i.e., in terms of media sensation and grandeur), cost efficiency drove up their longer-term
benefit tremendously. Through this decentralized, “leaderless jihad” franchising approach, AQ
was able to take advantage of “inspired groups and individuals to act in accordance with its
ideology, sometimes without any direct connection to the organization.”55 However, these lone
wolf attacks were more a response to successes in counterterrorism strategy than a premeditated
change in grand strategy.
Yet its traditional support network remained vital. And this was especially so for the cashgenerating elements of the Qā’ida web. Unlike financially independent groups like Afghanistan’s
Taliban,56 AQC never developed a means of self-reliance: it had no criminal enterprise, no tax
system, no drug trade monopoly, and no energy control. Prior to September 11, the majority of its
estimated USD 30 million in annual operating expenses were satisfied by contributions from
either non-governmental organizations, such as Wafa Charitable Foundation, or financial
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facilitators based in the Gulf.57 Contrary to popular claim, Bin Laden contributed relatively little
to his organization’s operating revenue, having had very limited access—about USD 1 million
per year—to the Bin Laden family fortune.58 Thus, the organization was almost entirely
dependent on donations from external sources. Funds from AQ financiers covered members’
salaries and family stipends, travel expenses, official bribes, and the many other basic necessities
of a terror group as a large and diverse as al-Qā’ida. These funds also financed its numerous
operations, including the 9/11 attacks, which cost the group approximately USD 500,000.59
Without access to its backers, al-Qā’ida’s operational funding would have dried up almost
entirely. And, indeed, counterterrorism specialists—including those at the United States
Department of the Treasury and the European financial institutions—targeted these networks
early on.60 In the post-September 11 years, AQ’s expenses decreased substantially, to only a few
million dollars per year.61 Part of this was undoubtedly due to (further) decentralization and the
organization’s increased utilization of lone wolf attacks, but the severance of connections
between AQC and its financial backers was probably also a major factor.

57

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Al Qaeda’s Means and Methods to
Raise, Move, and Use Money,” in Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph (Washington D.C.: National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States), 22.
58

Ibid., 20.

59

Ibid., 27-28.

60

These efforts are ongoing. See “Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators,” US
Department of the Treasury Press Center (September 24, 2014), available here: http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2651.aspx.
61

!

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Al Qaeda’s Means and Methods, 28.

41

These financial connections, and the ideologies they espoused, approximated the aims of
al-Qā’ida. Some donors were unwitting, unaware of the destination of their contributions, but the
many Imams, middlemen financiers, and small groups that knowingly fundraised on behalf of
AQ were doing so out of a deep commitment to shared beliefs. These were premised not only on
Bin Laden’s vision of a unified Umma but also on the manner by which he hoped to achieve it.
For them, a fundamental change in the international order was a necessary prerequisite to
unification: the connection between Middle Eastern regimes and their western benefactors had to
be cut. Local grievances certainly motivated this vision—both Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, abhorred the political situations in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, their respective
countries of origin—yet it simultaneously transcended political boundaries. From their
perspective, the root of the problem was Western greed and the West’s impiousness toward Islam
and the region’s people. Bringing down local governments without first—or at least concurrently
—taking on the much more powerful West would merely be a short-term fix. And the issue also
went beyond intra-faith disagreements. Sectarian differences had their place, but, for AQ leaders,
these were a matter to be dealt with later.62 In the short-term, fighting the West took precedence
over fighting other Muslims. This in itself was a step toward unification, but it was aimed,
primarily, at concentrating the efforts of AQ and its sympathizers on a single objective. Given
their limited numbers, having numerous targets and disunited strategies would only inhibit these
efforts.
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Many detailed accounts of AQ goals and strategies emerged following the US invasion of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Some scholars portray Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other AQ planners, as
architects of these responses, claiming that the New York and Washington attacks were merely a
part of a larger strategy to draw the West into protracted war—one which they were bound to
lose. Other scholars reject this farsightedness, writing it off as nothing more than an error in
judgement.63 But while the rational calculus of AQ and the extent to which its leaders were able
project their strategy are the subject of much debate, the overarching strategy and objectives of
the organization are clear: change first and unification second. This greatly limited the
organization’s options. Not only did Bin Laden lack a base of operations, but he had no army, no
tanks or anti-aircraft equipment, nothing capable of taking on the most powerful force in the
world. Absent a unified constituency, and without strength in numbers, Bin Laden was left with
few options and the organization’s momentum slowed. While AQ attempted to adapt to this
changed environment, there is no evidence that the decline in well-planned, high profile attacks
like September 11 and the bombings in London or Madrid, and the rise in lone wolf attacks was
actually part of a prior strategy designed to expand their mission.

!
4.2 Re-imagining ISIS: Key Differences
!

The recent spate of attacks carried out by ISIS-inspired lone-wolves, such as the recent attack on
a cafe in Sydney, Australia has contributed to the entrenchment of the organizations as being
seen as two sides of the same coin. As mentioned before, there are other immediately observable
similarities: both organizations seek to liberate Muslims and fight the West; both possess
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asymmetric strategies; both command relatively large international followings, use social media,
generate substantial funding, and draw-in numerous fighters; and both of their leaderships share
a common background. However, a closer examination reveals some important differences that
are of critical importance to counter strategy.
4.2.1 Strategy
Guiding its operations and organizational character, the Islamic State’s strategic doctrine is
principled on a few key pillars. Ultimately determined by ISIS’s primary objective, the
(re-)establishment and sustenance of the Caliphate, and also informed by political, military and
economic environmental factors, each of these three pillars is a fairly distinct departure from AQ
strategy.
(a) Strategy and Prioritization
The first pillar concerns prioritization. The Islamic State, like al-Qā’ida, envisions a
world in which Muslims are united under a Caliphate, free from the influence of western
imperialism and the pressures of the prevailing international order. How to go about achieving
this remains a marked point of contention between the two, however. Separating militant
jihadism into different camps are two different prioritization schemes. These reflect not only the
ideological differences between the founders of these groups, but also the regional climate—i.e.,
varying operational environments—in which they developed.
The first, to which al-Qā’ida subscribes, emphasizes strength of the opponent. For AQC,
weakening the west and emancipating the people of the Middle East from western imperialism is
a necessary prerequisite to bringing down “apostate” local regimes, bringing together Muslims,
and building a strong Caliphate. Doing so differently would have resulted in either strong
!
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resistance by a heavy-handed state (remember, we are talking AQ, prior to 2001) or immediate
intervention and assistance by the American military and its political establishment. Given the
circumstances at that time, this would have been an almost impossible approach. Thus, AQ
prioritized change—political, economic, and military change—over unification of Muslims. For
AQC, it was change first and Caliphate second.
The second strategy is the one ISIS came to embody. This strategy emphasizes strength of
the group—not of the enemy. For Baghdadi, and even for Zarqawi, bringing down local regimes
and establishing a base of power in the Middle East was a necessary prerequisite to defeating the
west. Informing this strategy were a number of political and social changes that occurred
following the American invasion, circumstances to which AQC never adapted its own strategy.
Toppling regimes that had already been toppled—i.e., Saddam Hussein’s and later, to some
extent, Bashar al-Assad’s—was easy and effortless; and AQI/ISIS knew that the US had neither
the political will nor the military might to sustain a permanent presence in the Middle East. Thus,
they prioritized unification and the building of a local power base—a la the Islamic State’s
Caliphate—over change in the international order, at least on the short term. For ISIS, it was
Caliphate first, change second. Whether one of these is more appropriate or more correct than
the other is not really important, but given the adaptation of ISIS strategy to current geopolitical
and social realities, ISIS policy certainly seems to have a better footing than that of AQ.
(b) Strategy and Sectarianism
The second pillar concerns sectarianism. Much like the other elements of AQ/ISIS
strategy, it was largely determined by environmental factors. ISIS and AQC both have similar
aspirations in this regard: an Umma premised on the very idiosyncratic and fundamentalist
!
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interpretations of their leaders, ones that categorically reject Shi’ism as un-Islamic. How they
handle Shi’a differ substantially, however, and generally correspond with two positions. That of
AQC is that all Muslims should be united first, under the broad banner of Islam, and their efforts
directed at fighting the very powerful west. More people, for them, means more force and more
of a chance for bringing about change. Only in the long term would these un-Islamic beliefs need
to be formally addressed. The position of AQI/ISIS favored the opposite strategy. Influenced to a
large extent by sectarian infighting and animosity—and, under post-Saddam Iraq, the more
profound problem of sunni marginalization—leaders in the Islamic State saw the Shi’a as the
world’s biggest problem. Part of the organization’s reason of existence, fighting Iraqi Shi’a was a
fixation even during its early affiliation with AQ; and this was one of the major obstacles in the
relationship between Zarqawi and al-Zawahiri.64
(c) Strategy and Military
The third and final pillar concerns the military dimensions of their strategy. Part and
parcel of AQC’s and ISIS’s take on unification/change was how to go about achieving these
ends, militarily. Again, there are two major, environment-influenced positions here. Absent both
a solid base of support and the necessary materiel, AQC was left with only the most asymmetric
of means to achieve there ends. They did have a place of refuge—first in the Sudan, and later in
Afghanistan—but they had none of the state-like resources and amenities that ISIS now has.
They had no army, no resources, relatively few members, and few places to train. Carrying out
sensational attacks—and later, smaller attacks, which were easier to pull off and generally more
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effective—were the only way to combat the “imperialist” powers, playing on the sentiments of
their populations and their subjection to domestic political will. In contrast, the Islamic State’s
strategy complemented its efforts at establishing a strong base of support in the Middle East.
With its swaths of land, relatively large population, and immense military and financial
resources, it took a hybrid approach for achieving its objectives: a mix of insurgent terrorism and
the strategies of conventional war. O’Neill offers the following on this type of insurgent
terrorism: “Terrorism is a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against noncombatants . . . [and] insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence because
terrorists seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term goals.”65 [emphasis
added] Not only does ISIS utilize the same type of terrorist-style attacks used by AQC, but it
simultaneously commands an army; offers its population social services like education, food, and
healthcare; uses psychological operations (PSYOP) and propaganda to counter its enemies; and it
even has its own intelligence service. This strategy is not one defined by intermittent terrorist
attacks or sustained insurgency; rather, it is a very complex mixture of all of these approaches.
4.2.2 Operations

!

Combined with the rapidly-changing sociopolitical environment of the Middle East, these
strategic distinctions further distort the operational-level differences between AQ and ISIS.
(a) Territorial Acquisition and Control
This distinction is most apparent in terms of territorial acquisition and control. Essentially
the root difference between the groups—and this goes back to the globally- versus locally-
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oriented strategies discussed in the previous section—acquisition of territory culminates in a
snowball effect of organizational growth. This has obvious implications on the group’s
organizational characteristics, such as fighters and fighter retention, quantity and quality of
military equipment, and (internal) sources of income. It also has strategic and operational
implications. As Metelits points out, “if we unpack the appraisal of territory by groups and the
state, we see that land may be valuable not only for population dominance but also for other
reasons of strategic significance, such as access to rivers for transportation or to attack more
valuable assets such as the provincial or national capital as an important step forward in
conventional warfare.”66
As of August 2014, ISIS had in its reigns an immense amount of territory, so much that it
eclipsed the size of many traditionally-defined states, spanning over 12,000 square miles.67 A
great deal of this territory was empty space, but it also included strategically-located towns and
cities—ones adjacent to border crossings, major supply routes, and critical infrastructure.68 That
it is a tangible, religious-based rejection of the modern state is in itself significant, but more
interesting is the level of governance and authority that it exercises: ISIS maintains near-absolute
physical control and exertion of governing responsibility over the majority of its claims. More
than anything, this gives the Islamic State an air of legitimacy, unseen by any other related
movement. But it also gave them safe-haven—a place to consolidate power and grow. Byman
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notes that, “even as [insurgents] strive to create a cause and wrest it away from their competitors,
they also need a respite from police, intelligence, and military services.”69 Neither al-Qā’ida nor
its AQI affiliate ever realized this type of continued territorial acquisition/control. The most they
ever achieved was exercise of ideological influence and religious persuasion over limited, and
non-contiguous, areas. Their antagonization of local security forces, by way of a few ragtag

militias, hardly met the same qualities of “territorial control” which characterize ISIS.
These acquisitions hyper-inflated the value of ISIS, and they did so almost immediately.
Following its unfettered march through Syria and its subsequent (re-)expansion into Iraq, all eyes
were on ISIS—including those of the international media. Their unprecedented assault not only
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on Sykes-Picot but on the political integrity of the entire region,70 catapulted their name into
dinner conversations across the world. For moderates cognizant of extremism and Middle East
fragility, this instilled anxiety and fear; for prospective militants seeking thrill, and active ones
seeking victory, this was something of which they aspired to be a part; and for those weary of
war and marginalization, it was a welcome relief, even if short-lived. It was their assault on the
very foundation of the international system—that of the Westphalian State and the behavioral
norms and institutions that define it—which gave it the fame it now has. Images circulating the
Web,71 depicting the intricately defined geographical boundaries of the Caliphate, struck into the
minds of all the gravity of ISIS. Despite the rejection of such aspirations by former CIA Director
John Brennan as a “feckless delusion,”72 the antiquated opinions of the Old Guard—the body of
scholars and practitioners built around the now-outdated and somewhat cliche Qā’ida
phenomenon—do little but sugarcoat an ominous reality. Baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and
expanding), a slogan at the very heart of ISIS doctrine,73 has of late scored the organization
countless wins in the face of this incredulity.
(b) Governance, Social Services, and Public Perception
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Taking charge of the Islamic State’s spoils of war required more than brute force. As they
did in Mosul, ISIS soldiers took to captured police vehicles in January to secure the streets of
Fallujah,74 in effect filling one of the many voids in municipal services. Quelling opportunities
for dissent certainly motivated this, but bombarding its new constituents with credible and
reliable public services—“winning the hearts and minds” of the people—was a key part of their
land grab. In the case of majority-Sunni regions like al-’Anbār, in addition to the rural areas of
eastern Syria, the central governments in Baghdad and Damascus had done little to fulfill their
social obligations. Food was short, crime was high, entire families had been displaced. This did
not go unrecognized by the Islamic State. Just as al-Shabab had done with their implementation
of neighborhood courts in Somalia,75 ISIS used this anarchy and instability as a free ticket to
connect with its new constituents—to ensure the marginalized that, while their Shi’a dominated
governments had failed them, the Islamic State had stepped-in and solved all of their problems.
These services had other applications. According to Byman, “Being able to create or tap
into a social services network offers tremendous advantages to proto-insurgencies. On a practical
level, it allows them access to legitimate institutions from which they can divert money or find
employment for followers. In addition, the social services network can assist group logistics—
the network that transfers supplies for a hospital or provides documentation for workers can do
the same for members of the insurgent movement.”76
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Baghdadi and his deputies formed a number of public administrative bodies, including
courts and various policing mechanisms; they handed-out food provisions to the poor; and they
implemented a tax-collection system, by which money could be redistributed to the needy and
the internally-displaced.77 They shipped-in fuel, fixed water lines, and repaired electrical towers,
all in a timely manner; and their educational system, at least in Manbij, saw noticeable
differences, with teachers finally being afforded substantive salaries.78 Journalism even had its
place in the new Caliphate, despite the scores of harsh rules which all but limited the field to diehard proponents of the regime.79 These efforts at institution-building are certainly not new. The
social services and institution building processes of various movements, such as Hezbollah and
the PLO, are well documented.80 But the rapidity and successfulness with which they have
institutionalized these services is quite astounding. All of this coordination assumed the character
of a complex bureaucracy, centered primarily in the Syrian city of Raqqa (notably, the former
capital of the Abbasid Caliphate). Sitting at the helm of this structure, Baghdadi appeared to be
controlling an entity that was looking more state-like by the day.
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Despite this, ISIS’ plan for social provisions proved somewhat less full-proof than they
had perhaps imagined. “Debates rage[d] among family members and friends in the privacy of
their homes about whether [ISIS] is a positive or negative force. No one complain[ed] about the
stability the group ha[d] brought, but the prospect of living under a totalitarian theocracy d[id]
not excite many, especially women.”81 Sentiments of its constituency—now numbering in the
millions—were mixed at best, but generally revealed a negative perception of ISIS and its new
leaders. Even though people abhorred their previous living conditions and welcomed stability
and relief, ISIS’s fundamentalism and overzealous enforcement of draconian punishment did
little to curb their appetite for change. Under their rule, “Religious police make sure that shops
close during Muslim prayers and that women cover their hair and faces in public. Public spaces
are walled off with heavy metal fences topped with the black flags of ISIS. People accused of
disobeying the law are punished by public executions or amputations.”82 Indeed, the people’s
place in the new Caliphate has essentially been one of servitude, not of citizen. Locals,
accustomed to the relative secularism under which they once lived—and seen as less-committed
to the Caliphate than its reverent foreign fighters—played almost no role in the Islamic State’s
bureaucracy or governance, from the beginning.83 This negative perception of its domestic
audience transcended the Islamic State’s borders. General Arab opinion of ISIS follows a similar,
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albeit quantifiable, trend: According to one poll done by the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, only 5% of Saudis, 3% of Egyptians, and 0% of Lebanese support the group.84
Regardless, the Islamic State commands the authority and resources with which to quell
dissenting opinion; and it remains ever-popular among its tens-of-thousands of committed
fighters. Suppression of opposition, and gradual indoctrination of these audiences over the longterm, will likely characterize ISIS’s way forward; the brutality and heinousness with which they
deal with infractions of Shari’a law will be the force behind this.
According to Byman, “[violence] can foster an identity, create a cause, outpace rivals,
attract outside support, and—most important—lead a state to overreact.”85 Their particular
violent character, at least with respect to AQ, also helps distinguish it from other jihadist
movements and attract new fighters. Byman explains that, “at times, dozens of cells are
competing for recruits and money, and a group that can successfully pull off attacks in the face of
state opposition demonstrates its prowess to would-be recruits.”86
Frequent executions and the display of corpses in public spaces serve as a stark reminder
the implications of questioning ISIS’ rule. Given the populations they have under their control,
and the pliability of their perception (especially for younger people), the ISIS constituency is
fertile ground for cultivating the future of its organization. Images of children holding the
decapitated heads of enemy corpses, and rifle-wielding Kazakh teens calling for the “slaughter of
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infidels,”87 speak volumes to the mentalities with which society will be forced to deal in the
future.
This is a strong departure from al-Qā’ida, of which this kind of tangible constituency is
entirely irrelevant. Apart from the audiences they were able to reach via the internet and other
media, they had relatively little (palpable) influence over non-followers. This is especially so in
the wake of their disrupted financial network and their decreased capacity to project fear through
sensational attacks. AQ was really nothing more than a vassal of the Afghan Taliban: it paid rent
for its land and training bases and exercised little governing authority. This likely delegitimized
AQ in the eyes of its followers to some extent, making it appear dependent on its host
government(s). And dependent it was. At one point, the Taliban even considered ejecting the
group from Afghanistan,88 as the Sudani government had done some years prior.89 Branding
implications aside, this reality made efforts to combat the group somewhat unique. By and large,
Washington adopted a CT policy toward AQ, whereby its operatives were individually targeted
and eliminated. This, of course, manifested in the form of a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan in
2002 and close cooperation with regional governments (e.g., Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, et al.),
and later as targeted, precision attacks, using contingents of special forces and armed unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).
(c) Instrumentalization of the Media
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The Islamic State’s instrumentalization of social and traditional media platforms is
another operational difference. A modern adaptation of Mao Tse-tung’s union of Army and
people through perception-shaping,90 the Islamic State has “built on [Mao’s] legacy and
developed an [information operations] campaign that is multidimensional, spread across different
platforms and that simultaneously targets its ‘friends and foes’.”91 Through its enormous online
presence, built on social networking sites like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, ISIS
leadership can reach very large audiences with ease. Its followers get live tweets, video streams,
and uncensored pictures from the battlefield, unfazed by the lax regulation of social media.
While members operate a number of unofficial accounts, ones which occasionally contradict
official position, there is a distinct element of organization about ISIS’s internet presence:

!

Its online and print media organization is efficient. Each online network such as Twitter, Facebook and
YouTube have designated moderators, and each “wilayah” (state) has its own dedicated social media
accounts, with Ninevah state, for instance, only posting news from that area.92

These accounts generally function as a single unit: unofficial ones, which may command
thousands of followers, pass-on and re-tweet announcements released from official accounts. In
effect, ISIS leaders have direct access to a media web with millions of redundant connections.
Even if regulations were tighter, breaking apart this network would be a tedious, and probably
near-impossible, undertaking.
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Officially part of the broader Al-Furqan Media umbrella, these outlets are an important
component of the Islamic State’s recruitment strategy. Technology-savvy internet administrators
appeal to prospective recruits using pop-culture, trending themes, gory eye-catchers, and other
consumer-oriented approaches. They even have their own equivalent of AQ’s Inspire magazine
and the Taliban’s Azan, a periodical which they dub Dabiq.93 Photos of fluffy, “mew-jahid”
kittens, straddling the butts of Kalashnikov rifles, epitomize the imagination and creativity of
their media moderators. Symbolic images like these, which tie everyday normality with militant
Islam and jihadism, spread quickly, often to unwitting audiences outside of their active support
base. Professionally-edited videos depicting battlefield euphoria and the unfettered dominance of
ISIS fighters are disseminated regularly via these same outlets.94 Also popular are battlefield
“selfies,” taken by uninterested fighters seeking to share their heroism and adventure with
friends and family, a phenomenon which Brian Jenkins dubs “jihad tourism.”95
All of these mediums appeal to different crowds in different ways, netting the largest
audience possible. As Ingram argues, through their targeting of “local, regional and global
audiences with multilingual offerings using a broad range of platforms,”96 they are able to
maximize this reach. But the nature of ISIS recruitment propaganda appears to be simultaneously
driving an ideological wedge between hardliners and the relatively (more) moderate Islamists.
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While this decreases its base of support to some extent, this could be in its interest, as it brings
together the meanest-of-the-mean, creating a force multiplier effect and making the organization
even more of a force to be reckoned with. While the average effect of recruitment propaganda on
its viewers is probably minimal—Who thinks it’s cute to let a kitten near a rifle, anyway?—if
taken as a whole, we see a different story. Even if only one person in half a million is influenced
by a catchy slogan, gruesome image, or battlefield story, these outliers add up quickly. As Byman
concludes, “[violence] is a form of propaganda. Such ‘propaganda by the deed’ is intended to
both educate the uncommitted on the cause in general and inspire them to act. Violence attracts
media attention, and thus the group serves as a magnet for like-minded fighters.”97
It also enables ISIS to spread fear—not necessarily to motivate political change, but
mostly to deter western interventionism into its affairs. It has something—land, resources, and a
relatively viable Islamic state—that it does not want to lose. “The necks of your citizens will be
cut, so long as you participate in the Crusade against Islam and the Muslims. #UK #US
#AlanHennig,” writes Mujahid Miski on Twitter.98 Through its internet interface with Western
audiences, Baghdadi and his deputies can exert strategic, indirect pressure on the governments
which they hope to influence. If they can instill real and tangible fear in the minds of their
enemies, they can distance these enemies from intervening in their affairs.
That is not to say their internet propaganda does not involve calculation for social or
political change—after all, “change” is very much a part of ISIS’s long-term vision, even if it is
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relatively less-important than unification. One Twitter offers the following, for example: “I say to
the United States that your time will come and we’ll bleed you to death and incha Allah we will
raise the flag on the White House.”99 A picture of an Islamic State flag displayed on a cell phone
in front of the White House, Tweeted from Twitter handle @sunna_rev in August, made the
threat that much more terrifying, and spoke to the strength and ubiquity of ISIS support.100
Whether these provocations were a detrimental miscalculation—and I believe they were
—is unimportant. The point is that ISIS has been immensely successful in its utilization of the
internet and social media, especially when compared to AQ. While it may very well have taken a
page from the AQ playbook, the level of ingenuity, imagination, and creativity which underlie
ISIS media production is unparalleled. No longer are the boring Bin Laden YouTube videos
which last hours on end and “[favor] the old style of Arabic speech-making.”101 Today’s jihadists
use romanticization, simple language, and pop-culture to convey otherwise uninteresting or
unappealing themes to tech-savvy and younger audiences. And they are doing remarkably well.
Traditional media outlets have done a good job at this, too. The explosion of coverage on
the Islamic State, following its June takeover of Mosul, brought international attention to an
organization which was, until then, relatively unknown. American domestic media outlets,
spanning the political spectrum from Fox News to MSNBC, propagated sensationalist exposes of
the Islamic State and its territorial advances. Fueled by ratings, the ISIS media fire grew and
continued to grow. Even academic communities, like Washington DC’s premier think tanks,
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exploited the growing appetite for all-things-ISIS. Horror stories, like that of murdered journalist
James Foley, and the graphic videos which followed them, were aired time-and-again, constantly
“analyzed” by political pundits. The now-famous beheading video, in addition to the numerous
others that followed it, are only a part of ISIS’s broader media strategy: to feed unthinkable acts
of barbarism to an international media machine that is hungry for violence. An unfortunate and
unavoidable reality of democracy, this uncensored, round-the-clock coverage of ISIS did
wonders for its recruitment campaign.

!
4.2.3 Organizational Characteristics
!

A number of organizational characteristics further define the growing gap between these
organizations. The most obvious, ISIS’ various instruments of hard power, are the ones which
the organization uses to acquire and control territory. As their territorial hold expands—and as
more weapons, fighters, and sources of income are absorbed—these divisions become even more
pronounced.
(a) Soldiers, Weapons Platforms, and Army
With the failing and weak security institutions of the Iraqi state, and the urban-centric
strategy, preoccupation and near-indifference of Assad’s military,102 hard power overwhelmingly
favored ISIS’s hand. Even for other organized rebel militias and ethnic groups—essentially the
last line of defense against the Islamic State—their resistances were rendered wholly ineffective
by logistical problems and strategic incoherence. Problems coordinating attacks, supply
shortages (including, ammunitions and weapons), general military inexperience, and, in the case
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of war-weary Syrian rebels, low esprit d’corps, produced only muddled attempts at rolling back
the Islamic State. Even major population centers, like Mosul, fared little hope:

!

The first line of Mosul’s defense was the sixth brigade of the Third Iraqi army division. On paper, the
brigade had 2,500 men. The reality was closer to 500. The brigade was also short of weapons and
ammunition, according to one non-commissioned officer. Infantry, armor and tanks had been shifted to
Anbar, where more than 6,000 soldiers had been killed and another 12,000 had deserted. It left Mosul with
virtually no tanks and a shortage of artillery.103

Indeed, the Islamic State was everything that the others were not: large, well-coordinated, wellequipped, and driven by the fervor of winning their own state. Without question, Baghdadi was
commanding one of the strongest unrecognized (i.e., non-state) military-like structures in
existence, on par with that of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. As of October 2014, they operated
the largest number of jihadist training facilities in the region, with twelve in Syria and nine in
Iraq.104 Conservative estimates from CIA put ISIS rank-and-file in the tens-of-thousands; others,
like that of Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, put them even higher, in the hundreds-ofthousands.105 With this kind of manpower, Baghdadi’s fighters were able to consume poorlydefended governorates like al-’Anbār, Nīnawā and the eastern provinces of Syria. Motorcades of
Nissan trucks and APCs, mounted by masked men surveying their spoils of war, swarmed towns
by the droves. The equipment they carried bore the defaced markings of their origin: Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf, the United States, Europe, and other western countries. The group seized
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numerous rockets and small arms, in transit from external third parties to Syrian rebel groups.106
State-of-the-art weapons platforms, like M1A1 Abrams tanks, M-46 130mm field guns, antiaircraft systems, and armor-piercing technologies,107 were but some of the other goods they
brought to secure their new claims. Captured on the field or marauded from state-controlled arms
depots, much of them originating as American military aid to Iraq, these weapons bloated the
arsenals of ISIS’s growing garrison of troops—and they would also even later challenge the likes
of the all-powerful US military. Short of western intervention, fighting them was a lost cause—a
David and Goliath battle without the slingshot. According to one Iraqi colonel, “In my entire
battalion we have one machine gun. In each pickup they had one.” [emphasis added]108
The grandeur of its army, its weapons cache, and the many images of its sensational
takeover is another difference. Especially for poorly equipped and meagerly compensated radical
militants fighting in Syria, this was an attractive option. Defections from other groups to the
Caliphate ran high early-on. For them, ISIS had it all: the braun, the morale, the glory, and the
guns, and they had the rewards to prove it. Complementing this new found zeal was a concurrent
devaluation of al-Qā’ida's currency. One of the starkest differences, apart from territorial claim,
was their deficiency in this type of hard power. Committed to its western-oriented agenda, AQ
simply could not achieve the military momentum that ISIS had sustained so easily; the snowball
effect of high fighter-retention, weapons accumulation, and growth in public support, simply
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never materialized. Aware of these shortcomings, ISIS was quick to exploit AQ weakness and
reveal Zawahiri’s impotence. Overtly challenging his leadership—through Baghdadi’s
declaration of universal jurisdiction in the Levant,109 an unthinkable act of insubordination—and
assassinating his emissary in Syria, Khaled al-Suri, were but two ways he undermined the
authority and legitimacy of Zawahiri’s AQC. This was all strategic, meant to gain defectors,
increase his stature, and take advantage of the unprecedented security vacuum in Syria and Iraq.
In Aaron Zelin’s words:

!

Another way the Islamic State could gain “ungoverned” spaces or build up its capacities and networks is
through creating breakaway groups of members that defect from al-Qaeda branches to Islamic State
“territories” in places like Syria, Yemen, Somalia, or North Africa. The recent successes on the battlefield
in Iraq (and now again in Syria due to a shifting of new resources gained in the Iraqi offensive) and the
announcement of the Caliphate, the Islamic State perceives that this could push more factions, individuals,
or groups to join up with its cause and reject the “out of touch” leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri.110

(b) Finances
Financial sustenance is another key difference, one intimately connected to territorial
acquisition. Unlike al-Qā’ida, which largely funded itself and its operations through the external
financial connections outlined in Section 4.1, ISIS transformed itself into a financially
independent organization early-on. By the time it brokered its formal relationship with al-Qā’ida,
the organization had already established a lucrative and self-sufficient funding scheme.
According to declassified AQI financial ledgers from 2005 and 2006, its administrative branch in
al-‘Anbar province, alone, grossed an estimated USD 373,000 per month.111 More than 50% of
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this revenue was from selling stolen goods, “most of which were highly valuable capital items,
such as construction equipment, generators, and electrical cables.”112 While external donations
constituted a portion of its overall revenue—albeit a small portion, amounting to less than USD
250,000, over the course of a year—other sources, like car sales and extortion, were nearly twice
as much.113 By and large, these sources remain unchanged. According to congressional testimony
by Patrick Johnston,

!

The key difference between the financial activities of [ISIS’s] predecessors and the financial activities of
[ISIS] now is not in kind but rather in scale. Most recent estimates suggest that [ISIS] makes between $1-3
million per day. In contrast, ISI’s master financial ledgers in Mosul show that the group made an average
of slightly less than $1 million per month between August 2008 and January 2009. Although it is unclear
how much of present-day [ISIS’s] revenues are made in and around Mosul, the key fact is that it used to
take the group a month to make what it now makes each day. These resources have been critical enablers of
[ISIS’s] success in seizing broad swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq and in waging a two-front war
against multiple governments and other non-state armed groups.114

New opportunities, and the absence of authority, help explain this difference in scale. Absent
strong state institutions or an occupying foreign power like the US, virtually nothing was able to
deter ISIS from kleptocratic tendencies—not even the ardent religious principles for which its
members claim to stand. Unjust seizure of property, extortion of “religious tax” from
blasphemers, and petty theft, are merely reflections of its members’ shared criminal history,
brought to the surface by lawlessness.
Despite these continuities, one facet of its income has evolved markedly: oil production.
Although analysts are of mixed opinion about AQI’s past reliance on oil production,115 they
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generally agree that oil revenue, today, makes up a sizable portion of its income—about USD 1
million per day.116 The point where this oil enters external/global markets is an obvious,
exploitable vulnerability, yet relatively little is actually known about these dealings. Declassified
AQI/ISIS accounting records afford almost no attention to hydrocarbons sales. Some media
reports suggest that oil from Syrian production sites is sold to political connections within the
Damascus government and/or to Turkish officials,117 but the veracity of these claims is
questionable. Other reports paint an intricate picture of a complicated underground smuggling
network, through which Syrian middlemen traffick barrels of cheap crude oil across the porous
borders of Turkey. Its buyers, Turkish businessmen, “[sell] it secretly to gas stations or set up
illegal filling stops.”118 The group maintains control over 60% of oil production in eastern Syria,
in addition to a number of smaller production sites in Iraq. Even with its export of 30,000 barrels
per day (at about USD 35 per barrel), ISIS still has enough surplus to meet local refineries’
demands.119 In fact, satisfaction of these internal petroleum needs is the destination of an
increasingly large portion of its oil.120 Not only does this reduce reliance on external markets and
potential points of leverage for western economic sanctions, it also helps develop domestic
dependency on ISIS’s heavily subsidized fuel.
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This strategy of resource exploitation is not unique. A number of parallels can be drawn
between ISIS’ oil production and the exploitation of commodity exports (CE) in other rebellions.
Examples include UNITA’s smuggling of oil and diamonds during the Angolan civil war; Charles
Taylor’s exportation of timber during the Liberian civil war; and the Khmer Rouge’s sale of
rubies and tropical timber in communist Cambodia. FARC drug exports and the Afghan Taliban’s
poppy production serve as yet another example. In both cases, drug commodities were a staple
commodity fueled by external consumption—ones which, if eradicated entirely, would have had
a significant impact on local populations—and remained relatively “invulnerable.”121 According
to Collier and Hoeffler, the presence of these CE types increases risk for conflict significantly,
from about 0.5% risk (for countries without CE) to 23% (for countries with CE).122 That ISIS
success would have been hindered in a non-resource rich area—one whose economy is not
highly dependent on the exportation of hydrocarbon commodities—is not an unreasonable
assumption.
Other areas of their criminal enterprise generate significant cash-flows. Although its
incidence is decreasing, kidnapping-for-ransom once brought in substantial operating revenue.
One Scandinavian corporation, for example, paid USD 70,000 for one of its kidnapped
employees.123 Similarly, prior to his videoed beheading, ISIS demanded USD 132.5 million for

121

Marks, Urban Insurgency, 140.

122

See Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in Leashing
the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson,
and Pamela Hall (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2007), 201; and Paul Collier and Anke Heffler, “Greed
and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), 574. See also James Fearon and David
Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75-90.
123

!

“‘Multiple kidnappings for ransom’ funding ISIS, source says,” CBS News (August 21, 2014).

66

the return of journalist James Foley,124 a payment which the US was unwilling to make. Taxgenerated income has also increased. This is a tactic which has been employed by many other
insurgencies—notably Colombia’s FARC, which earned nearly USD 700 million per year from
kidnapping (and drug exports),125 and Nigeria’s Boko Haram. ISIS earned USD 12 million per
month through illicit taxation systems in Mosul even prior to taking over the city; this is now
being undertaken in a more-systematic, more-organized manner.126 Road tolls on highways
connecting Jordan, Syria and Iraq, for example, are but one means for collecting these levies.
Even control of resources like wheat and water, and the priceless ancient artifacts dotting the
swaths of land they occupy, help bankroll their operations.127
What makes all of these sources of income so interesting is that, with only a few
exceptions, they are all internally generated and relatively immune to targeted fiscal policies or
economic sanctions. Unlike AQC, whose financial base was almost entirely external and thus
vulnerable to targeting, combatting ISIS’s domestic enterprise is extremely difficult. Moreover,
the magnitude of their funding gives them a level of influence and leverage that AQ never saw.
As Collier points out, the difference between a successful resistance and an unsuccessful one is
their varying “opportunities to raise revenue.”128 And, indeed, “if … such criminal incentives
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exist, one would expect them to have an overriding influence on insurgents’ behavior, since these
actors are at the whim of the global economy, and illicit activities offer fast ways to raise
revenue.”129 Unlike AQ, ISIS can sustain and feed a population, maintain their supply lines and
weapons, strengthen their infrastructure, and, most importantly, attract to their ranks thousands of
new fighters looking for competitive salaries and stipends. Yet another example of the snowball
effect.
(c) Leadership and Structural Organization
The organizational structure and leadership of the Islamic State is another point of
inquiry. Mirroring the various social services they provide their citizens, as outlined in Section
4.2.1, the Caliphate is organized into a number of individual bodies, both functional and
jurisdictional. At the top of its hierarchically-organized executive structure is the Caliph,
currently occupied by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Perhaps a bit megalomaniacal, the self-appointed
Emir claims control, not only over the Islamic State, “but also [over] every other salafist/takfiri
group in the world.”130 His appointment was said to have been a “surprise” by some, and “to
have been engineered by an ex-Colonel from the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard, Samir Abed Hamad
al-Obeidi al-Dulaimi.”131 Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari, former Turkmen
Baathists and close confidantes of the Caliph, act as his deputies in Iraq and Syria. Maintaining
their connection with Baghdadi are intermediaries like Abu Yahya al-Iraqi.132
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While these top-tier executives “set the overall strategic objectives of the group,”133 a
number of lower, semi-autonomous councils look after the organization’s basic administrative
and military functions. These councils “oversee strategic planning, military operations and
civilian administration,”134 advising Baghdadi on matters pertaining to media, intelligence,
security, finance, and other issues.135 Complementing the functional councils are two other
important bodies. First is the Shura Council, headed by Abu Arkan al-Ameri and composed of
about a dozen former Iraqi Baathists.136 The Islamic State’s highest advisory body, the Shura
Council is “responsible for conveying directives from Abu Bakr [al-Baghdadi] down the chain of
command and for ensuring that they are carried out. It decides on laws [of the Islamic State] and
their implementation […].”137 Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari are both believed
to be members of the Shura, in addition to the Military Council’s Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, the Media
Council’s Amr al-Absi, and ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami.138 The second
body is the Shari’a Council. Composed of six members and overseen by Baghdadi, “its duties
include selecting a Caliph and ensuring the compliance of all other parts of the administration
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with Shari’a law, according to its own interpretation.”139 The Soufan Group describes it in the
following manner:140

!

With help from the Sharia Commissions, headed by Abu Mohammed al Aani, [the Shari’a Council] is
responsible for ensuring party discipline, providing rules and deciding penalties for their infringement,
supervising the sharia police and courts and overseeing ideological outreach (dawa), both in areas under
the State’s control and beyond.

Finally, in the lowest executive rung are between a dozen and two dozen local administrators.
These provincial governors, nearly all of whom were former Iraqi officials, report on matters
concerning local administration and military operations to Baghdadi’s deputies.
Given this rough picture of ISIS’s internal organization, three things are worth noting.
The first concerns the group’s hierarchical structure and chain-of-command. Perhaps resembling
al-Qā’ida centralization in the 1990s—albeit, much more collectively led—ISIS’s current
organization allows it to efficiently and rapidly transmit directives from the top-down. Although
to some extent inherited by Baghdadi when he assumed control of AQI (following ISAF
withdrawal),141 this structure has in recent years become much more defined: new positions have
materialized, procedure has become more systematic, and the top brass have become more
powerful and more symbolic. Importantly, its structure and centralization have enabled Baghdadi
and his top planners to consolidate competing strategies into a single narrative and to transmit it
through their chain-of-command, all the way down to local- and battlefield-commanders.
Because of this, ISIS now has the level of offensive and defensive coordination necessary to
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capture and retain large cities and territories, despite the (limited) internal defenses they face in
doing so. As insurgency practitioner Regis Debray put it, “The lack of a single command puts the
revolutionary forces in a situation of an artillery gunner who has not been told which direction to
fire… The absence of a centralized executive (political and military) leadership leads to such
waste, such useless slaughter.”142 Indeed, research shows that, compared to decentralized,
“networked” groups, hierarchically-organized insurgencies fare much better on the battlefield.143
As noted in the backgrounder section, al-Qā’ida core became highly decentralized after 2001 in
order to increase its operational security and sustain the integrity of its organization. This
compromised AQC’s ability to achieve the level of efficiency and coordination that Baghdadi’s
Islamic State now has.
Second, there is a clear division of administrative and military duty in the Islamic State.
This division of responsibility has reduced the level of micromanagement necessary to keep the
organization viable. With the help of his deputies, provincial governors, and various technocrats,
Baghdadi is able to manage the daily operations of his vast organization with relative ease, and it
allows him to keep getting bigger and stronger. Although partially irrelevant to AQC, as neither
Bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri controlled tangible constituencies or large memberships, lack of this
division may explain part of AQC’s relative weakness. Because of the operational constraints on
AQC—due to the immense amount of CT activity against it and its operatives—it was unable to
maintain the same type of centralized, role-oriented structure. In effect, it was unable to expand
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its size and sustain its momentum. Although somewhat of a circular, chicken-and-egg argument,
it represents the snowball effect this paper has stressed so much already. ISIS managed itself
well, AQ did not.
Third, Islamic State leadership share a very similar background. By and large, Baghdadi’s
appointed executives were career military professionals who served under Saddam Hussein in
Baathist-controlled Iraq. Baghdadi appointed them partly because they were old and trusted
colleagues, with a common mindset and shared background. But he also chose them for strategic
reasons, as they brought to ISIS an immense amount of military knowledge, regional
understanding, and governing ability—all traits which Baghdadi believed would allow him to
sweep through Iraqi cities and quickly institute mechanisms of control. Most of AQC, although
certainly educated on political theory and governance, did not have this same level of practical
experience.
(d) Membership Composition
A final point of inquiry is the composition of its membership. Despite their apparent
ideological commonality—i.e., recognition of Baghdadi’s Caliphate—ISIS members reflect an
extremely diverse organization: they come from many different cultures, bring with them many
different mentalities, and seek many different goals. It is no minor detail that nearly 15,000
foreign fighters, hailing from scores of countries, now call the Islamic State home.144 What it
means to wage “jihad” for an American (fighter) probably means something far different for a
Chechen or an Indonesian, which almost certainly differs from that of the average Syrian or
Iraqi. Foreigners are likely driven more by religious fervor or adventurism, whereas locals are
144
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driven, if not by religion or adventurism, by fear, anger, resentment, or necessity. These are
differences which should inform—not hinder—CT/COIN strategy. Blanketing ISIS with policies
solely countering ideological extremism, for example, would do little to address the basic
grievances (e.g., lack of security, social marginalization, political disenfranchisement, etc.) which
have driven so many into the organization.
Pre-existing, competing ideologies are also important. Remember that many of the ISIS
rank-and-file once subscribed to the AQC vision of the Caliphate, either as members of AQI or
as defectors from the broader AQ franchise. This is important because, even if we write-off ISIS
as aspiring primarily to Umma unification—and not to attacking the West, at least on the short
term—there still remains vestiges of the AQ Old Guard’s sentiments. While Islamic State leaders
mostly maintained their own idiosyncratic approaches to the Caliphate—even during their
affiliation with ISIS—and institutionalized these approaches in their current doctrine,
policymakers should still be weary of ideological aberrations. Just as ISIS is not equivalent to
AQC, ISIS is also not completely internally uniform.
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4.3 Conclusion: An Outdated Framework
!

To completely dissociate al-Qā’ida from the Islamic State is not the objective of this analysis.
That similarities exist is readily and abundantly clear, and need not further qualification. ISIS’s
and AQ’s histories are intimately connected, as are their beliefs, principles, and basic behaviors.
And there are many lessons to be learned from our dealings with these organizations, lessons that
can be applied to other DOD counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Indeed, alQā’ida policy should inform Islamic State policy, and Islamic State policy, likewise, should
inform al-Qā’ida policy.
What the point of this analysis is, however, is to show empirical evidence that al-Qā’ida
and the Islamic State, despite their many similarities and common origins, are two very different
organizations. Their basic nature may, in fact, be the same, but their behaviors and strategies are
quintessentially incomparable. The point is also to critique current policy, offering analytical
nuance to DOD’s understanding of the Islamic State, perhaps provoking a partial review of
current policy or a complete revision of US position.
From this, we can also extract key organizational weaknesses which can inform our
COIN/CT policies, ones which parallel the activities of other, well-documented movements. For
example, the Islamic State’s hierarchical structure, as much as it gives ISIS coherence,
organization, and efficiency, is an exploitable vulnerability. As one scholar notes, “in line with
contemporary thinking, hierarchies are somewhat vulnerable to decapitation strikes.”145
Eliminating top leadership, as was done with the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), the
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Angolan UNITA, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the LTTE (Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers), and
Sandero Luminoso (i.e., Shining Path), led to major organizational disruptions—and sometimes
defeat—when their leadership cadres were eliminated.146 Another weakness is its urban presence.
While a number of advantages arise from urban insurgency, it can also bring about
vulnerabilities: “the longer [insurgencies last], the easier it be[comes] for the government to zero
in on insurgent leadership and cadres. Tight quarters and rapid communication provide securityservice informers ample opportunity to observe and track insurgent activities.”147 Even their
violent MO, an above-discussed strength, also serves as a weakness. According to Connable,
insurgencies which practice the ISIS type of “indiscriminate terror” tend to end more quickly
than those that do not.148 The ongoing dispute between AQ and ISIS,149 likewise, reveals a
number of opportunities for counter-insurgents. According to Byman, “because there is
competition for both identity and the cause itself, the primary foe of [a] proto-insurgency in the
early stages is perhaps not the government, but the welter of rival organizations vying for recruits
and money. Many of these organizations seek to exploit the same cause but use a different
identity or platform to do so.”150 Strength, itself, is one of ISIS’ biggest weaknesses.
Overconfidence, which plays in the favor of counterinsurgency, is often an overlooked
vulnerability of resistance movements. The LTTE, for example, “was so confident in its military
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capabilities that it pulled out of peace talks in 2003, even after achieving de facto
semiautonomous self-rule. Six years later, Sri Lankan military forces had rebounded and crushed
the LTTE insurgents.”151
Premised on the supposition that ISIS and AQ are entirely synonymous, military leaders
are reluctant to adopt ISIS-specific counterinsurgency/counterterrorism policy. According to
Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Department of Defense’s position is that,
“[ISIS], though they claim to be broken off from al-Qaida, they were born of al-Qaida, and alNusra is an offshoot of al-Qaida. So in our minds, from our military perspective, they are very
much one and the same.”152 [emphasis added] And even Deputy national security adviser Antony
Blinken draws this conclusion, failing even to acknowledge their breakup: “Zarqawi, the founder
of al-Qaida in Iraq was a colleague of Osama Bin Laden before [9/11], very close to him. After
9/11, he formed al-Qaida in Iraq. They associated themselves with al-Qaida.”153
Although certainly a product of the Obama administration’s political maneuvering around
congressional oversight—he was using the same congressional authorization for the use of
military force (AUMF) as that delegated to President George W. Bush for dealing with AQ—his
administration’s reluctance to define ISIS in its own terms is both a failure of imagination and a
consequence of analytical tunnel vision.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Policy Recommendations
____________________________________________________

!

How to tackle the Islamic State is an obvious point of contention. Especially within the policy
community, Washington circles remain divided on the best next step forward, even as the Obama
Administration okays and begins its quickly-conceived plan for rolling back ISIS. This
discussion is defined by three broader issues—probably better thought of as “given
constraints”—which are worth mentioning briefly.
First, the Department of Defense has showed very little strategic competence in the
Middle East, in general, over the past decade. Years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed little
more than our pronounced inability to understand, correctly formulate, and incorporate strategy
into MENA policy. (This is, incidentally, the subject of an interesting monograph recently
published by RAND154) If that is not convincing enough, then a quick look at our position
toward Syria and Turkey would probably be more self-evident. Second, the Obama
Administration is mired in a weak foreign policy, one aimed almost exclusively at balancing
opinion and deflecting criticism. And this is true on both the domestic and international levels
and with respect to nearly all American foreign interests. Third, the body of scholarly work,
legislation, and legal precedence which accumulated post-September 11 have structurally and
institutionally bound our abilities to think clearly and act decisively. Years of analyzing the
Qā’ida network have warped our understanding of other groups—their strategies, their tactics,
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and their goals. Just as we saw with Obama’s most recent overture in Iraq, it has also
necessitated flamboyant political maneuvering in order to circumvent these boundaries (in this
case, the legal boundaries), only further perpetuating the problem.
Despite these structural/institutional problems, a fresh policy perspective is in order.
What DOD is dealing with in Iraq and Syria, as argued in depth in the previous chapter, is a
relatively new kind of phenomenon, the composite sum of ISIS’s surroundings over the past
decade. It is not just a terrorist organization, and it is not simply “one and the same” as AQ.
Seeing it either of these ways is both misleading and counterproductive. Rather, the Islamic State
is an adaptive entity, one which has absorbed not only the tactics of its old affiliate, AQ, but even
those of western armies like that of the American military. They were there during the US
occupation, and they surely saw the ways in which the US fought and how and by what means it
interacted with its host people. Through their experience—and they have a lot of it—they know
and understand PSYOP, winning hearts and minds; from their knowledge of AQ and their years
of insurgency/terrorism, they know how to instill terror and fear; and they know how to work the
Media and hold territory. This should inform Washington’s policy. Yet even that classification
falls short.
The Department of Defense needs to fundamentally rethink the Islamic State. It needs to
base its understanding, not only on precedence—the cases of al-Qā’ida and the Taliban, for
starters—but also on the own merits of the Islamic State. What is ISIS? What do they want? And
how do they plan to get it? Using intellectual resourcefulness and analogizing certainly have
their place in policy formation, but given what is at stake for the United States if ISIS succeeds
in their endeavors, this should be saved for less-pressing situations with fewer consequences.
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In this regard, and on the basis of the evidence presented herein, seven points should
accompany—and indeed define—any change in DOD policy with respect to ISIS:

!

1. Adoption of a hybrid counterstrategy. An air-only campaign is unsustainable and
counterproductive on the long-term.155 DOD should increase utilization of tier-one special
forces contingents, especially those with a counterterrorism mandate. Teams should provide
reconnaissance on training camp locations, leadership movements, and operative activity in
urban areas, coordinating with air divisions. This approach was utilized successfully in the
early days of the 2001 anti-Taliban Afghan offensive.156 Special Forces should work closely
with local forces and militias, like the Syrian and Iraqi Peshmergas or the Sons of Iraq,157158
to increase counterterrorism capacity, understanding of counterinsurgency and counterideology fundamentals, policing ability, and weapons maintenance and operation. This
cooperation should also include sustained aid, weapons and ammunitions provisions, and
intelligence sharing.159 This hybrid approach should be population-centric, aimed at:
environment formation and perception-shaping; clearing insurgents; holding territory;
155
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David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996), 369-370.
Michael Knights offers some specific policy options for correcting Kurdish weaknesses in “What Iraq’s
Kurdish Peshmerga Really Need,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (August 7, 2014).
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building-capacity; and transitioning to host government institutions.160 This was a COIN
approach utilized successfully in the 1940s against the Hukbalahap movement in the
Philippines.161 Overt increase in conventional boots should be avoided, as it runs counter to
“hearts and minds.” Efforts should include coordination with local political bodies and
psychological operations (PSYOP) directed at non-supporters and supporters of the Islamic
State. These should encourage defection and internal resistance; obstruct fighter retention and
recruitment efforts; and shift blame of civilian casualties onto ISIS through (counter-)
information operations (IO).162
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2. Disruption of territorial integrity. Disrupting the contiguity of the Islamic State should be a
central effort. DOD aerial contingents and Special Forces should target lines of
communication and transportation infrastructure, including major highways, roads, and
railways. Destruction of infrastructure should be avoided, as it runs counter to PSYOP effort
and social stability. Separating bases of support weakens the Islamic State and its capacity to
mobilize operatives and delegitimizes its claims. DOD should coordinate these efforts with
local militias and use attritional approaches to weakening and separating bases of support and
internal resistance.
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3. Disruption of military activity. Efforts in disrupting and destroying command-and-control
centers, communications, and training locations should be sustained, with a strong emphasis
on casualty minimization. UAV and cruise missile targeting should be contingent upon field
reconnaissance by local militias or Special Forces. DOD should coordinate with their
counterparts in the Turkish government to lift restrictions on Incirlik Air Base operations, and
to coordinate CT/COIN efforts along the Syrian-Turkish border, where ISIS light armor and
weapons platforms are now concentrated. Iraqi and Syrian weapons depots within the
boundaries of the Islamic State should also be targeted. Increased deployment of military
advisers to Iraq in order to increase antiterrorism and COIN capacity is also advised.
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4. Disruption of governance. DOD should disrupt governing capacity of the Islamic State.
Careful balance between ISIS incapacitation and irreparable damage to Iraqi and Syrian
critical infrastructure should be duly exercised. Such an effort may target administrative
buildings, media infrastructure, energy sources and other locations peripheral to the most
basic social essentials (e.g., markets, hospitals, etc.). This should also include targeting of
ISIS leadership personalities (i.e., decapitation strategy), including Baghdadi and his
deputies, members of the Shari’a and Shura Councils, and heads of the functional councils.163
PSYOP should be directed at local communities to encourage resistance and mass
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disobedience. Elements from Vietnam, Iraq, and other PSYOP efforts should inform these
activities.164

!

5. Severance of financial sources. DOD, in conjunction with the Department of the Treasury,
should work toward disruption of external financial sources, including Gulf-based
financiers.165 Cooperation with regional governments, including the Qataris, Kuwaitis,
Emiratis and Saudis, should be an important part of this effort. Disruption of internal
financial sources should be given the utmost attention, and will likely require cooperation
with the Turkish and Syrian governments and utilization of Special Forces contingents.
Lessons learned from the 2001 Taliban counterinsurgency/counter-narcotics campaign, which
targeted similarly internally-generated income (and which, in the case of drugs trafficking
and production, also negatively impacted on domestic populations, as opium was a staple
commodity),166 should inform these efforts. Oil distribution infrastructure and production
sites should be targeted, but not destroyed; highway checkpoints should be eliminated; access
to the international financial system should be cut, its finances frozen, and sanctions against
its leadership and facilitators implemented.167
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6. Disruption of online propaganda. DOD should implement a counter-propaganda and psych
ops strategy for combatting Islamic State social media success. The US government should
work with social networking sites to better monitor and respond to this online activity. DOD
should increase cyber intelligence and cyber psych ops/counter-propaganda,168 including
creation of fictitious accounts that delegitimize ISIS and dilute its internet presence.
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7. Formation of regional partnerships. Securing a regional network of partners is crucial to
combatting a transnational threat.169 DOD should redouble its efforts in intelligence sharing,
policy coordination, and military cooperation with the Saudi, Qatari, Kuwaiti, Emirati,
Jordanian, Israeli, Turkish and Egyptian governments. Multilateralism is the ideal stage, but
in many instances bilateral relationships will define these partnerships. Of particular
importance is enhancing intelligence cooperation/sharing with the Turkish government on a
number of issues: movement of individuals across borders; in-flow of Iraqi/Syrian crude oil;
ISIS border activity; Kurdish resistance efforts and political machinations; Syrian rebel
activity; and other issues.
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APPENDIX A: Summary chart of operational, organizational and strategic differences.

!

Islamic State

Al-Qā’ida

STRATEGY
Unification

Emphasis on group strength:
Caliphate first, political change
later

Emphasis on opponent strength:
political change first, Caliphate
later

Sectarianism

Conversion/elimination important

Conversion/elimination later;
unity important

Military

Terrorism, insurgency, and
conventional military

Terrorism

Territorial Acquisition

12,000 sq. miles of contiguous
land in Syria, Iraq

N/A

Governance

Bureaucratic structure;
governorates and governors;
social service provisions;
administrative buildings;
institutional structure

N/A

Social Media

Full social media potential

Previously antiquated use of
social media, but now full
potential

Mass Media

Constant media coverage

Decreasing media coverage

OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

!

Structure

Centralized; statelike, but also
asymmetric; large rank-and-file;
very coordinated

Training Facilities

Operating 12 camps in Syria and
9 in Iraq

Soldiers/Fighters

30,000 - 100,000 (estimates
very)

3,000-4,000 (estimates vary)

Fighter Retention

High fighter retention

High defection rate

Recruitment

Highly successful recruitment
campaign

Stagnated recruitment

Weapons

Advanced weapons platforms,
incl. M1A1 main battle tanks,
antiaircraft systems, anti-armor
technology, howitzers, and light
armor, et al.

Few advanced weapons
platforms; weapons primarily
asymmetric in nature (i.e.,
explosives specialists like alAssiri design innovative IEDs)
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Largely diffuse; highly
asymmetric; small rank-and-file;
increasingly uncoordinated

Islamic State
Finances

Internal sources (e.g.,
hydrocarbons, taxes, theft,
extortion, kidnapping); External
sources (e.g., Gulf-based
financiers)

External sources only (e.g., Gulfbased financiers)

Membership Composition

Diverse; disproportionately large
foreigner contingent

Diverse; disproportionately large
foreigner contingent
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Al-Qā’ida
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